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Climate change impacts such as sea level rise (SLR) and coastal erosion are expected to make 
relocation an inevitability in certain coastal areas of the United States. Although climate 
migration is anticipated to become a widespread phenomenon, it remains a nascent policy area 
and the government has provided limited support to community-led relocation efforts thus far. 
Existing federal programs that may enhance climate change preparedness are not designed to 
facilitate migration. Drawing on lessons from previous relocation projects and research regarding 
the benefits of national investment in climate resilience, this paper recommends that Congress 
establish a new grant program under the Coastal Zone Management Act to increase federal 
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On July 6, 2020, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report 
titled Climate Change: A Climate Migration Pilot Program Could Enhance the Nation’s 
Resilience and Reduce Federal Fiscal Exposure following a request from five Senators to 
examine “the extent of federal support for communities’ climate migration efforts.”1  The report 
details how federal funding has primarily focused on post-disaster recovery while providing 
limited support to climate migration efforts, and there has been little research done on migration 
as a resilience strategy.2 
 
Statement of the Problem 
Experts have calculated that 13.1 million people in the U.S. will be directly impacted by sea level 
rise (SLR) by the year 2100 under a 1.8 meter SLR scenario.3 In the shorter term, the Internal 
                                                     
1 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Climate Change: A Climate Migration Pilot Program Could Enhance the 
Nation’s Resilience and Reduce Federal Fiscal Exposure, GAO-20-488 (Washington, DC, 2020), accessed August 19, 
2020, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-488. 
2 This paper uses GAO’s definitions of climate resilience and climate migration. Climate resilience encompasses 
climate adaptation and pre-disaster hazard mitigation, and “enhancing [it] means taking actions to reduce potential 
future losses by planning and preparing for potential climate hazards, such as extreme rainfall, sea level rise, and 
drought.” Climate migration “is the preemptive movement of people and property away from areas experiencing severe 
climate change impacts…and encompasses both (1) the relocation and resettling of an entire community to a different 
site and (2) managed retreat, or the gradual, controlled movement of a portion of a community’s infrastructure, 
facilities, homes, and businesses out of the most hazardous areas.” Climate migration is a new field of research, and 
formal terminology has not yet been established. GAO-20-488, p.1-2. 
3 Caleb Robinson, Dilkina, B., and Moreno-Cruz, J., “Modeling migration patterns in the USA under sea level rise,’ 
PLoS ONE 15(1): e0227436 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227436; Mathew Hauer, Evans, J. and 
 2 
Displacement Monitoring Centre’s (iDMC) global risk model has projected that an annual 
average of 100,729 people are at risk of being internally displaced by flooding and storm surge, 
while recognizing that this figure is an underestimation.4 Although methodologies for predicting 
climate migration vary among experts and organizations, it is clear the phenomenon will critically 
affect certain coastal populations. As depicted in figure 1, the impacts of SLR are highly 
regionalized. The southeastern region of the U.S. is expected to face disproportionately high 
impacts and represents “nearly 70% of the entire projected populations at risk.”5 Almost half of 
Americans exposed to SLR are located in Florida alone.6  
To date, the federal government has not invested in climate resilience to the extent that it 
would be equipped to support climate migration activities induced by SLR. The Fourth National 
Climate Assessment (NCA) released in 2018 stated that moving millions of people and billions of 
dollars in infrastructure is an undertaking that “creates challenging legal, financial, and equity 
issues that have not yet been addressed” and there are coastal regions where “retreat will become 
an unavoidable option” except under the lowest SLR projections.7 In the coming decades, many 
communities will need to consider migration, and literature and research suggest there could be 
population movements on a scale similar to that of the Great Migration from 1910 to 1970.8 
                                                     
Mishra, D. “Millions projected to be at risk from sea-level rise in the continental United States,” Nature Climate 
Change 6, 691–695 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2961. 
4 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (iDMC), Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019, United States of 
America – Figure Analysis – Displacement Related to Disasters, https://bit.ly/2JuX539; United States – Country 
Information, iDMC, https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/united-states. 
5 Hauer et al. “Millions projected to be at risk from sea-level rise in the continental United States,” Nature Climate 
Change, p. 692; Mathew Hauer, Fussell, E., Mueller, V. et al. “Sea-level rise and human migration,” Nature Reviews 
Earth & Environment 1, January 2020, p.33, https://doi.org/10.1038/s43017-019-0002-9; Robinson et al., p.11. 
6 Hauer et al., “Sea-level rise and human migration,” Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 1 (2020), p.34. 
7 U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth 
National Climate Assessment, Volume II, [Reidmiller, D.R., C.W. Avery, D.R. Easterling, K.E. Kunkel, K.L.M. Lewis, 
T.K. Maycock, and B.C. Stewart (eds.)], 2018, p.1329, https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/. 
8 GA0-20-488, p.27-30; Hauer et al., “Millions projected to be at risk from sea-level rise in the continental 





According to data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
the U.S. experienced 69 separate billion-dollar weather and climate disasters during a five-year 
period (2015-2019), costing over $525 billion. In 2019, there were 14 separate disasters, 
amounting to $45 billion in costs. The agency also pointed out an emergent trend that these 
billion-dollar disaster events are “becoming an increasingly larger percentage of the cumulative 
damage from the full distribution of weather-related events at all scales and loss levels.”9 These 
figures do not reflect the total cost of disasters. Since they only account for billion-dollar events, 
the actual total cost is higher. 
The increasing reliance on the government’s role as the provider of disaster aid has a 
direct relationship with the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events that accompany 
climate change. Federal fiscal exposure due to climate change risks has been on GAO’s High-
Risk List since 2013.10 The latest update to the list indicated that the “federal government has not 
made measurable progress to reduce its fiscal exposure to climate change” and the increasing 
                                                     
9 Adam B. Smith, “2010-2019: A landmark decade of U.S. billion-dollar weather and climate disasters,” National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), January 8, 2020, https://www.climate.gov/news-
features/blogs/beyond-data/2010-2019-landmark-decade-us-billion-dollar-weather-and-climate.  
10 GAO, High-Risk Series, GAO-19-157SP, (Washington, DC, 2019), p.110, 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/697245.pdf.  
Figure 1. Projected Populations at Risk from SLR in the 
USA under a SLR Scenario of 1.8m by 2100. (Nature 
Reviews Earth & Environment, 2020.) 
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dependence on post-disaster aid is a “key source” of that exposure.11 Combined with insufficient 
funding allocations for climate resilience, greater dependence on federal funds could reinforce the 
lack of progress in reducing fiscal exposure associated with climate change risks. 
Community relocation is one example of a disaster risk-reducing activity that targets a 
specific climate change impact like SLR.12 It can be a costly undertaking, ranging between 
$200,000 and $1 million per capita, and may require decades to complete.13 While individual 
agencies including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) have made ad hoc efforts to fund climate migration 
activities, a broader view of spending indicates that federal investment in this area remains 
limited and is mostly provided in the post-disaster environment.14 SLR is considered a slow-onset 
event, which is defined as an event that “[evolves] gradually from incremental changes occurring 
over many years or from an increased frequency or intensity of recurring events.”15 Even if 
foreseeable, slow-onset events often receive less attention than rapid-onset disasters like 
hurricanes.16 An analysis of FEMA’s own funding history illustrates this phenomenon. In 2015, 
GAO reported that the agency utilized an estimated 6% ($222.9 million) of its allocations on pre-
disaster mitigation from 2011 to 2014 (figure 2).17 These are symptoms of continued federal 
                                                     
11 GAO-19-157SP, p.110-111. 
12 FCCC/TP/2012/7, p.12-13. 
13 Hauer et al., “Sea-level rise and human migration,” Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 1 (2020), p.34; GAO-20-
488; GAO, Alaska Native Villages: Limited Progress Has Been Made on Relocating Villages Threatened by Flooding 
and Erosion, GAO-09-551, (Washington, DC, 2009), p.31-32, https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09551.pdf. 
14 GAO-20-488, p.30-33, 37; GAO, Hurricane Sandy: An Investment Strategy Could Help the Federal Government 
Enhance National Resilience for Future Disasters, GAO-15-515 (Washington, DC, 2015), p.31-32, 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-515. For example, FEMA’s Pre-disaster Mitigation Grant Program and HUD’s 
National Disaster Resilience Competition – both of which aim to address certain hazards and build resilience before 
disasters occur. 
15 This is the definition for slow-onset events that is recognized by the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). Siegele L., Loss and Damage: The Theme of Slow Onset Impact, 2012, Germanwatch; 
Aside from SLR, slow-onset events also include “increasing temperatures, ocean acidification, glacial retreat and 
related impacts, salinization, land and forest degradation, loss of biodiversity and desertification.” UNFCCC, Technical 
Paper, FCCC/TP/2012/7, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/tp/07.pdf.  
16 Jonathan Boston, Panda, A., Surminski, S., “Designing a funding framework for the slow-onset impacts of climate 
change,” The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Grantham Research Institute on Climate 
Change and the Environment, August 18, 2020, https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/news/designing-a-funding-
framework-for-the-slow-onset-impacts-of-climate-change/.  
17 GAO-15-515, p.32. 
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emphasis on rapid-onset events and post-disaster response, and an inadequate effort to prevent 
future damages to the nation’s environment, economy, and public safety and health. Not enough 
resources are presently being aimed at actions that would proactively reduce the high cost of 




A 2018 report by the National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) asserted that, by 
investing in certain types of resilience projects to protect lives and property, communities can 
reap benefits that would outweigh the eventual cost of foregoing those investments.18 Yet, there is 
no formal guide at the national level to select such investments. As of October 2019, the federal 
government did not have a strategic approach to investing in climate resilience projects.19 The 
lack of leadership and guidance on how to prioritize funding is one of the reasons why both fiscal 
exposure and disaster mitigation remain problematic. For example, in lessons learned following 
Hurricane Sandy, GAO found that the focus of federal funding on the post-disaster environment 
hindered officials’ capacity to invest in measures that could improve resilience against future 
                                                     
18 Multihazard Mitigation Council, National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS), Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: 
2018 Interim Report, (Washington, DC, 2018). 
19 GAO, Climate Resilience: A Strategic Investment Approach for High-Priority Projects Could Help Target Federal 
Resources, GAO-20-127 (Washington, DC, 2019), p.19-20, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-127.  
Figure 2. FEMA Pre-Disaster Mitigation Allocations and Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program Estimated Awards from FY2011-
FY2014. (GAO analysis of FEMA data, GAO-15-515, 2015.) 
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disasters. Officials expressed that “a more effective approach to disaster resilience would be to 
plan and implement hazard mitigation before a disaster occurs.”20 
Climate migration is not a new phenomenon in the United States, but experts and federal 
officials have said that little research has been done on it as a specific resilience strategy.21 The 
intersection of climate change and migration requires more attention from the federal government 
if experts anticipate that vulnerable communities will face slow-onset events like SLR, requiring 
residents to determine if, when, or how to relocate based on place-based needs. As stated in the 
NCA, “coastal communities will be among the first in the Nation to test existing climate-relevant 
legal frameworks and policies against [climate change impacts] and, thus, will establish 
precedents that will affect both coastal and non-coastal regions.”22  
 
History & Background 
 
Climate migration is regarded as a policy area that remains underdeveloped despite the global 
impact that climate change is expected to have on society. Compared to the amount of data on 
climate and human mobility that governments and multilateral institutions possess, international 
experts have articulated that “discussion of policies to manage environmental migration is in its 
infancy.”23 The concept of migration due to environmental hazards, specifically those 
exacerbated by human activity, can be traced back to environmental analyst Lester Brown’s 1976 
account of “ecological refugees” retreating from land degradation and desertification caused by 
overgrazing in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.24 While this description was a secondary topic within 
a broader discussion focused on global population growth concerns, it signified early interest in 
migration patterns triggered in part by undesirable environmental conditions. The issue became a 
                                                     
20 GAO-15-515, p.34. 
21 GAO-20-488, p.30. 
22 USGCRP, Fourth National Climate Assessment, p.324.  
23 Susan Martin, “Climate change, migration, and governance,” Global Governance (2010) 16, 397–414, 
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_and_environment.pdf. 
24 Brown, Lester, Patricia L. McGrath, and Bruce Stokes, “Twenty-Two Dimensions of the Population Problem,” 
Worldwatch Paper 5, Worldwatch Institute, March 1976 p. 39-40, https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED128282.pdf.  
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more glaring concern in the research and policy arenas in the decades that followed. Climate 
migration gained prominence on the international stage after 1990, when the United Nations 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—the UN body responsible for assessing 
climate science—released a key report predicting that migration “would likely be the most 
significant short to mid-term outcome of anthropogenic climate change.”25 The study of U.S. 
climate migration is comparatively new. In 2016, some of the first modeling of U.S. migration 
caused by SLR was published in Nature Climate Change.26 The study revealed that a 1.8 meter 
SLR scenario would push 13.1 million people away from receding coastlines by 2100. When 
accounting for indirect impacts that reach farther inland (e.g. rising rivers, saltwater intrusion, 
etc.), as many as 50 million more people in metropolitan areas would be affected.27 
SLR has already threatened low-lying wetlands in the United States. Some of the first 
instances of climate migration efforts began to unfold in Alaska in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Relocation efforts of indigenous communities in Shishmaref and Newtok are two examples. 
Shishmaref, a traditional Inupiat village located on a barrier island, has experienced chronic 
erosion and SLR is expected to cause more coastal flooding while the community is running out 
of space to move away from the shoreline.28 As early as 1953, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(hereafter referred to as the Corps) had already assessed that relocation would be cheaper than 
building a seawall to protect against bluff erosion. The villagers later voted to relocate in 1973 
                                                     
25 “About the IPCC,” International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), https://www.ipcc.ch/about/; Elizabeth Marino, 
"The long history of environmental migration: Assessing vulnerability construction and obstacles to successful 
relocation in Shishmaref, Alaska." Global environmental change 22, no. 2 (2012): p.376; “IOM Outlook on Migration, 
Environment and Climate Change,” International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2014, p.66, 
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mecc_outlook.pdf. 
26 Hauer et al., “Sea-level rise and human migration,” Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 1 (2020); Abrahm 
Lustgarten, “Climate Change Will Force a New American Migration,” September 15, 2020, ProPublica, 
https://www.propublica.org/article/climate-change-will-force-a-new-american-migration.  
27 Hauer et al., “Millions projected to be at risk from sea-level rise in the continental United States,” Nature Climate 
Change 6, p.691; Abrahm Lustgarten, “Climate Change Will Force a New American Migration,” September 15, 2020, 
ProPublica. 
28 State of Alaska, Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development, Division of Community and 




when the area experienced two severe fall storms that caused widespread erosion and damage. 
However, that decision was reversed after the chosen relocation site was deemed uninhabitable 
due to “an extensive layer of permafrost.” 29 It was not until 2002 that the village voted again to 
relocate, after suffering more weather-related problems. Between the 1970s and early 2000s, 
several protective measures against erosion were attempted, and approximately $5 million was 
spent on these projects. By 2009, there was still no agreement among federal, state, and village 
officials on relocation sites that would be safe and suitable for the needs of the villagers of 
Shishmaref and two other villages (Kivalina and Shaktoolik) that experts anticipated would need 
to move “all at once.”30 
In Newtok, riverbank erosion had already been identified as a chronic problem by 1983.31 
Upon the request of the (then) City of Newtok, consultants were hired to conduct the Ninglick 
River Erosion Assessment, which found that if erosion was left unchecked, it would “endanger 
structures within 25 to 30 years” (i.e. 2008-2013).32 Similar to what the Corps found in 
Shishmaref in the 1950s, consultants examining the situation in Newtok concluded in 1984 that 
relocating “would likely be less expensive than trying to hold back the Ninglick River.”33 In 
1994, the village began a concerted effort to resettle in Mertarvik on Nelson Island, and over a 
decade later, the Newtok Planning Group—comprised of federal, state, regional and village 
partners—was established in 2006 to help accelerate the migration process. More recently, the 
                                                     
29 GAO, Flooding and Erosion in Alaska Native Villages, GAO-04-142 (Washington, DC, 2004), p.33-34, 
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04142.pdf. 
30 GAO-09-551, p.31-32. 
31 GAO-20-488, p.15. 
32 State of Alaska, Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development, Division of Community and 








Denali Commission was designated in 2015 to be the lead agency to help coordinate resources 
and assist communities.34 
The ongoing climate migration efforts in Shishmaref and Newtok, among other 
indigenous communities, have been associated with two key underlying weaknesses: (1) lack of 
clarity on federal leadership around coordination and (2) challenges to accessing funding for 
short- and long-term climate resilience projects. Newtok’s relocation is seen as successful 
compared to other vulnerable villages, but there is room to improve processes and support for 
migration operations. Government officials and Alaskan stakeholders said that residents are still 
exposed to “increased disaster risks because the relocation to Mertarvik will not be complete 
before coastal erosion and flooding make Newtok uninhabitable.”35 Projects have been prolonged 
for decades due to logistical, administrative, and financial constraints. Congress has been 
informed of the obstacles and varying success of climate migration in Alaska through several 
GAO reports in the past twelve years, including in 2009, 2019, and 2020, but improvements are 
slow.36 As a result of the 2009 report, the White House directed the Denali Commission to create 
the Village Infrastructure Protection (VIP) Program in 2015 to provide additional support to rural 
Alaskan communities threatened by environmental hazards.37 Nevertheless, financial support 
remained inadequate to address the risks places like Shishmaref, Newtok and others face. As of 
March 2019, the VIP Program did not have a formal unmet need estimate, but the Commission 
wrote that it was “certainly hundreds of millions” of dollars.38 
The delayed progress of these relocation projects reflects the federal government’s 
overall inexperience in handling climate migration. In addition to there being no federal entity 
                                                     
34 GAO-20-488, p.16. 
35 GAO-20-488, p.17. 
36 For example: GAO-09-551, GAO-20-127, GAO-20-488. 
37 Denali Commission, “Village Infrastructure Protection,” https://www.denali.gov/programs/village-infrastructure-
protection/. 
38 Denali Commission, Village Infrastructure Protection Program (VIP Program), Fact Sheet, March 2019, 
https://www.denali.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/VIP-fact-sheet-web.pdf.  
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designed to lead and coordinate processes, existing law and disaster aid center on the response-
side of natural hazards and disasters. Today’s “federal programs are not designed to support 
climate resilience efforts in general or climate migration efforts specifically.”39 Where there has 
been limited support, individual agencies were able to provide “ad hoc funding through existing 
federal programs for projects that may convey some climate resilience benefits.”40 Investments in 
climate resilience are generally siloed within the bounds of agencies’ mission areas and 
authorized programs, as well as guidelines provided by the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB).  
There are a limited number of programs dedicated to pre-disaster climate resilience, and 
none are specifically meant to tackle climate migration. Coastal communities that did decide to 
relocate have received some federal funding through existing programs. The 1988 Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Section 203) authorized FEMA’s Pre-Disaster 
Mitigation (PDM) Grant Program to assist states, local governments, territories, and tribes in 
improving resilience against natural hazards before a disaster occurs.41 The Stafford Act does not 
explicitly mention climate change, but individual projects funded by PDM funding “may convey 
climate resilience benefits” through flood diversion and storage, and green infrastructure, among 
other measures.42 Historically, the program’s budget has fluctuated and individual awards have 
been capped, thereby limiting the impact that potentially large-scale projects could have, per 
GAO interviews with FEMA officials. The Disaster Relief and Recovery Act of 2018 (DRRA) 
included amendments to the Stafford Act, subsequently replacing the PDM Grant with the 
Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) program. FEMA was still in the 
process of finalizing a program policy for it earlier this year. The notices of funding opportunities 
                                                     
39 GAO-20-488, p.30. 
40 GAO-20-488, p.30; GAO-20-127, p.15. 
41 FEMA, “Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) Grant,” https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/pre-disaster; GAO-20-488, 
p.31-32. 
42 GAO-20-488, p.31. 
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(NOFO) for the BRIC program for FY2020 is $500 million, and annual funding is expected to 
increase depending on disaster activity.43 While the NOFO also does not reference climate or 
migration, it does specify the following program priorities that could convey climate resilience 
benefits through approved projects:44 
• Incentivize public infrastructure projects; 
• Incentivize projects that mitigate risk to one or more lifelines; 
• Incentivize projects that incorporate nature-based solutions; and, 
• Incentivize adoption and enforcement of modern building codes. 
 
FEMA’s Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) Grant Program, which is part of the National Flood 
Insurance Reform Act (1994), is another example of a proactive program which intends to build 
resilience and reduce risk to populations and structures from future hazard events. This, too, can 
convey resilience benefits and help reduce reliance on federal disaster aid over time, but was not 
originally intended for climate migration projects. 
The process of designating a federal entity to lead on climate migration is currently in 
limbo. In December 2016, there was an attempt to establish an Interagency Working Group on 
Community-Led Managed Retreat and Voluntary Relocation.45 Eleven federal agencies, 
including the Department of Agriculture, HUD, the Denali Commission, FEMA, NOAA, the 
Corps, and five others would have signed a memorandum of understanding to establish the 
working group with the intention to create a framework for climate migration that “identified the 
federal role in a community-led process to address current and future needs.”46 This did not move 
forward with the transition to President Trump’s administration. There was no resultant guidance 
set forth that would facilitate the development of “federal institutional capability to assist 
                                                     
43 FEMA, “Fiscal Year 2020 Notices of Funding Opportunities for Hazard Mitigation Assistance Grants,” August 2020, 
https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/fy2020-nofo; GAO-20-488, p.32. 
44 FEMA, “The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) FY 2020 Building 
Resilient Infrastructure and Communities,” August 2020, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/fema_fy20-
bric-notice-of-funding-opportunity_federal-register_August-2020.pdf.  
45 Christopher Flavelle, “Obama’s Final Push to Adapt to Climate Change,” Bloomberg News, December 15, 2016, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2016-12-16/obama-s-final-push-to-adapt-to-climate-change. 
46 GAO-20-488, p.39. 
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communities with retreat or relocation.”47 According to GAO, the federal government has not 
only taken inadequate action in response to recommendations on enhancing climate resilience 
with respect to migration efforts, it has also regressed in terms of reducing fiscal exposure from 
climate change risks.48 
Key Actors 
Climate change is a cross-cutting subject that will involve many actors in the progression of 
migration activities. Coastal communities are at the center of this matter, as they are directly 
exposed to hazards that are, or will be disrupting their lives. As of 2019, more than 126 million 
people (approximately one-third of the total U.S. population) reside in coastal counties, many of 
whom fall under the “elevated coastal hazard risk category.”49 They are vital contributors to the 
economy, producing 46% of the country’s economic output ($8.6 trillion in goods and services) 
and providing 56.8 million jobs.50 The diverse circumstances and needs at the local level within 
this group are critical to planning effective climate migration operations across the coastline.51  
Stakeholders including the scientific community, advocacy organizations, and other 
international entities are likely to influence the design of prospective strategies around climate 
migration as well. Expert organizations and environmental groups produce and disseminate 
information and best practices based on the latest science, which are intended to inform 
decisionmakers and stakeholders when creating and implementing policies. At the international 
level, institutions such as the IPCC, UN Environment Programme, International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), World Bank, and other coalitions monitor and share information on country-
level data and policies on climate change and migration around the world. At the same time, there 
                                                     
47 GAO-20-488, p.39. 
48 GAO-19-157SP, p.110-111; GAO-20-488, p.40. 
49 NOAA, Office of Coastal Management (OCM), “Fact Sheet: NOAA’s National Coastal Zone Management Program 
- Funding Summary 2019,” https://coast.noaa.gov/data/czm/media/funding-summary.pdf; NOAA, OCM, “Fast Facts - 
Economics and Demographics,” https://coast.noaa.gov/states/fast-facts/economics-and-demographics.html.  
50 NOAA, OCM, “Fact Sheet: NOAA’s National Coastal Zone Management Program - Funding Summary 2019.” 
51 GAO-20-488, p.19, 29, 52. Place-based needs and cultural sensitivities around community relocation are discussed 
throughout the July 2020 GAO report. 
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are interest groups that lobby for or against progressive environmental policies being considered 
by the U.S. government. They may advocate for environmental protection and justice (e.g. the 
Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council, Greenpeace), or for 
deregulation of environmental policies and skepticism of global warming (e.g. American 
Enterprise Institute, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Cato Institute).52 
All levels of the U.S. government are engaged in climate policy, from the federal level 
down to the local level. Federal agencies are widely impacted by climate and would be expected 
to implement resilience policies. In 2013, President Obama issued an Executive Order to create a 
Task Force on Climate Preparedness and Resilience comprised of 26 state, local, and tribal 
leaders, and an interagency Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience that involved over 
25 agencies in order respond to community needs across the country, and “to develop, coordinate, 
and implement priority Federal actions related to climate preparedness.”53 These groups were 
dismantled in 2017 by President Trump.54 Even so, it is arguable that the leaders and agencies that 
had been convened will remain relevant in their respective roles to address coastal hazards 
moving forward. At the federal level alone, the departments and offices include: the Global 
Change Research Program (USGCRP), OMB, HUD, Department of the Treasury, Department of 
Transportation, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce (including NOAA), 
Department of the Interior, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Homeland Security, 
Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of State, National 
Science Foundation, Department of Defense (including the Army Corps of Engineers), Council of 
Economic Advisers (CEA), Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), and Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP). 
                                                     
52 “Global Warming Skeptic Organizations (2013),” Union of Concerned Scientists, 
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/global-warming-skeptic-organizations.  
53 Executive Order 13653 of November 1, 2013, Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change, 78 
C.F.R. 66817-66824, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2013-11-06/pdf/2013-26785.pdf  
54 Executive Order 13783 of March 31, 2017, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 82 C.F.R. 






The proposed policy, titled as the “Disaster Mitigation and Coastal Resilience Act,” is an 
expansion of NOAA’s role in accounting for changes along the U.S. coast by requiring the 
Secretary of Commerce (hereafter referred to as the Secretary) to establish a new coastal 
resilience program to improve climate change preparedness.55 Pursuant to Section 309 of the 
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1971 (CZMA), the agency has implemented the Coastal Zone 
Enhancement Program, which last accepted grant proposals in 2018.56 The new program is 
modeled after Sec. 309 by focusing on the following “coastal zone enhancement objectives” 57 
under subsection (a) of the section: 
2. Preventing or significantly reducing threats to life and destruction of property by 
eliminating development and redevelopment in high-hazard areas, managing 
development in other hazard areas, and anticipating and managing the effects of potential 
sea level rise and Great Lakes level rise. 
5. Development and adoption of procedures to assess, consider, and control cumulative and 
secondary impacts of coastal growth and development, including the collective effect on 
various individual uses or activities on coastal resources, such as coastal wetlands and 
fishery resources. 
 
However, the proposed grant is distinct from the Coastal Zone Enhancement Program in its goal 
to increase federal capacity to support climate migration activities by making $100,000,000 
available to the Secretary each year for this direct grant through FY2030, and its removal of 
restrictions on acquisition and capital projects.58 It would create up to 20 awards to provide 
financial and technical support to eligible states and territories (hereafter referred to as states) that 
                                                     
55 This would be similar to what is put forward in the Coastal State Climate Preparedness Act of 2019 (H.R. 3541), 
which was introduced in the House by Representative Salud Carbajal (D-CA-24) on June 27, 2019. The bill aligns with 
the goals of coastal resilience but does not explicitly mention resilience. 
56 GAO-48-488, p.34. 
57 16 U.S.C. § 1456b. Coastal Zone Enhancement Grants (Section 309), https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/act/sections/#309.  
58 NOAA, OCM, Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) Section 309 Program Guidance: 2021 to 2025 Enhancement 
Cycle, June 2019, https://coast.noaa.gov/data/czm/media/Sect-309_Guidance_2021-2025.pdf. 
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have developed climate resilience plans to reduce their exposure to environmental risks that have 
made, or will imminently make coastal communities uninhabitable. 
 
Policy Implementation Tool 
The CZMA is a voluntary program, and the 34 states that currently participate each 
develop and implement a coastal management program (CMP) that must first be approved by the 
federal government as required by the law. CMPs are “comprehensive management plans that 
describe the uses subject to the management program, the authorities and enforceable policies of 
the management program, and the boundaries of the state’s coastal zone, the organization of the 
management program, and related state coastal management concerns.”59 Every level of 
government is involved in coastal management under CZMA, and this would also apply to the 
proposed grant program. 
At the federal level, its policies and provisions are implemented by the Department of 
Commerce through NOAA’s Office for Coastal Management (OCM).60 Only states with NOAA-
approved CMPs and resilience plans would be eligible to apply for funding. In those resilience 
plans, states will be expected to identify localities that need urgent action to address hazards that 
are making residences uninhabitable and other structures unsustainable in their current locations. 
In addition, a disaster need not be declared by the president in order to make states eligible to 
apply. Proposals would be submitted directly to the agency’s notice of funding opportunity 
(NOFO) associated with this grant program. Once the grant agreement is finalized through a 
competitive process, state and local governments would then execute the approved activities that 
fall under the coastal zone enhancement objectives targeted by this program. 
                                                     
59 Alaska is currently the only eligible coastal state that is not participating in the program, as they voluntarily withdrew 
in 2011. Thus, 34 of 35 eligible states currently have federally approved CMPs. NOAA, OCM, CZMA – Federal 
Consistency Overview, February 24, 2020, https://coast.noaa.gov/data/czm/consistency/media/federal-consistency-
overview.pdf.  
60 Congressional Research Service (CRS), Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA): Overview and Issues for Congress, 
R45460, January 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45460.pdf.  
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Similar to the Coastal Zone Enhancement Program’s requirements outlined in Sec. 309, 
subsections (d) and (e), the Secretary will be responsible for promulgating regulations concerning 
this grant, and state contribution will not be required for any proposal for which funding is 
awarded. However, this resilience program would differ from Sec. 309’s funding provision in 
subsection (f) by establishing a higher limit for the amount the Secretary can utilize for 
implementing the new program. Compared to the yearly $10,000,000 limit for the Coastal Zone 
Enhancement Grant, the maximum would be changed to $100,000,000 annually for the new 
program.61 The tenfold increase is intended to enable NOAA to finance longer-term (10+ years) 
disaster mitigation and coastal resilience projects, as well as low-cost acquisition and capital 
projects that states have determined to be critical for vulnerable coastal communities in their 
resilience plans.  
Policy Authorization Tool 
This policy would be proposed in the form of an amendatory bill—the “Disaster Mitigation and 
Climate Resilience Act”—that would add a section to the CZMA describing the grant program, 
and reauthorize the appropriations for CZM Program.62 After being introduced, the bill would be 
debated in the assigned standing committee for approval before moving to the Senate floor for a 
vote. Working with colleagues in the House of Representatives who support this proposal could 
present an opportunity to introduce a companion bill in the House around the same time. That bill 
would undergo committee deliberations and a floor vote of its own and would require a simple 
majority for passage. If the resulting bills are different, both chambers must work in a conference 
committee to reach a consensus and finalize the bill before sending to the president. It would then 
be signed into law or vetoed within 10 days. Should Congress choose to override the veto, it 
would need a two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate.63 
                                                     
61 16 U.S.C. § 1456b. Coastal Zone Enhancement Grants (Section 309), https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/act/sections/#309. 
62 16 U.S.C. § 1456b. Coastal Zone Enhancement Grants (Section 309), https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/act/sections/#316.  
63 U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 7, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlei; U.S. Senate Glossary, “Override of 






The federal government has never implemented a program designed specifically for climate 
migration activities as a resilience measure. The grant program set forth in the Disaster Mitigation 
and Coastal Resilience Act is an opportunity to fill that gap by providing financial support to 
communities that have federally vetted plans to increase their resilience against slow and rapid-
onset events that endanger lives and economies across the U.S. coastline. According to GAO 
interviews, NOAA officials have indicated that assistance for coastal zone management is in high 
demand, and state coastal zone managers have expressed that the agency’s financial assistance 
was critical to their work, albeit insufficient. Stakeholders also emphasize the value and 
importance of this federal support, and that it should be increased.64 
In terms of making financial support for climate migration more effective, this grant 
program could tackle certain weaknesses that GAO found in examples of past federal support for 
voluntary relocation efforts in states like Alaska, Maryland, and Louisiana. First, it would 
eliminate the administrative requirement that funding is only made applicable to specified 
disasters that have already taken place. States would have greater access to federal resources 
without first experiencing a declared disaster to be eligible for assistance, and potentially face less 
competition with other types of infrastructure projects.65 This would lessen the financial 
                                                     
64 CRS, Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA): Overview and Issues for Congress, R45460, January 2019, p.14, 16, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45460.pdf; GAO, Climate Change: Information on NOAA’s Support for States’ Marine 
Coastal Ecosystem Resilience Efforts, GAO-16-834, September 28, 2016, p.16, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
16-834.  
65 Lessons learned from the Canadian government’s Disaster Mitigation and Adaptation Fund (DMAF), indicated that a 
source of funding explicitly for resilience projects enabled proposals to avoid competing with other infrastructure 
projects for funding as they do in other programs that cover multiple eligible project categories. DMAF itself was 
created in 2018 with the specific intention of financing climate resilience projects over a 10-year period using 
approximately US$1.5 billion. GAO-20-127, p.53-54; Government of Canada, “Backgrounder: Disaster Mitigation and 
Adaptation Fund,” May 17, 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/office-infrastructure/news/2018/05/backgrounder-disaster-
mitigation-and-adaptation-fund.html.  
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constraints on enhancing resilience, given that the majority of federal funds for hazard mitigation 
have been provided in the post-disaster recovery phase. 
As seen in Newtok, the village’s request for a formal disaster declaration in 2016 was 
rejected by the president because disaster aid provided under the Stafford Act cannot be applied 
to slow-moving disasters (a.k.a. slow-onset events) such as coastal erosion caused by SLR and 
storm surge. This categorization subsequently posed an obstacle to the community in its search 
for financial assistance under ‘non-disaster’ circumstances even though the Village Council had 
already agreed years earlier that relocation was necessary.66 The proposed program removes this 
restriction by opening up resources to vulnerable communities that have identified proactive 
climate migration plans to enhance resilience against slow-onset events. 
Second, the implementation of this grant can assist in improving strategies and impacts of 
federal investments in climate resilience projects. In interviews conducted by GAO, stakeholders 
expressed that using both existing and new funding “in a strategic, coordinated way could help 
increase the impact…and makes it less likely that high-priority projects fall through the cracks 
and more likely that these projects will help agencies work toward a common strategic goal.”67 
According to GAO and CRS reporting, questions have been raised regarding how effectively 
CZMA has been implemented by NOAA over the years. Weaknesses linked to the agency’s 
limited use of performance data, assistance to states for coastal ecosystem resilience, and grant 
approval processes were causes for concern about the program’s effectiveness.68 This grant 
program’s provisions would intend to complement and improve coastal zone management by 
strengthening project proposal evaluations and prioritization strategies, funding capacity, and 
performance monitoring. 
                                                     
66 GAO-20-488, p.16-17. 
67 GAO-20-127, p.56. 
68 CRS, R45460, p.12-13. 
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 By requiring states to have NOAA-approved CMPs and resilience plans prior to applying 
for the grant, the Disaster Mitigation and Coastal Resilience Grant program necessitates federal 
engagement with states that generates agreement amongst the levels of government that are 
involved, including the local community that has decided to relocate. This could contribute to the 
efficiency of the grant program on the ground by creating a degree of collective agreement before 
submitting an actionable proposal, and simultaneously expanding adoption of resilience practices. 
Furthermore, the requirement can help account for the unique cultural, socioeconomic, and 
political characteristics of U.S. coastal communities in planning prospective climate migration 
activities. In its recommendations to Congress, the GAO has highlighted the effectiveness of 
community-led planning because it can also lead to program efficiency by “[expediting and 
building] public support for climate migration” based on interviews with federal officials and 
stakeholders in Alaska and Maryland.69 Since the concept of locally-driven, voluntary climate 
migration planning is built into the design of grant program, the resultant proposals and approved 
projects could help improve implementation by effectively addressing the specific needs of these 
communities. With little consensus, poor planning, and lack of consideration towards place-based 
factors, the parties involved in executing a partial or full relocation could face administrative and 
logistical delays that would waste NOAA funding. 
Increasing national investment in climate resilience through the enactment of this 
proposal could also save the federal government hundreds of millions of dollars. This category of 
investment has been touted in the environmental policy sphere as an effective method of reducing 
future disaster costs.70 Disaster losses in 2017 exceeded $300 billion, which was 35% of the 
building value at the time. The World Resources Institute (WRI), an international environmental 
                                                     
69 GAO-20-488, p.43-44. 
70 GAO-20-127; Bob Simison, “Investing in Resilience,” International Monetary Fund (IMF), Finance & Development, 
December 2019, Vol. 56, No. 4, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/12/pdf/climate-change-and-
investing-in-resilience-simison.pdf.  
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research organization, listed the U.S. as one of the top 10 countries with the highest increase in 
urban assets to be damaged by coastal flooding in 2030. As depicted in figure 3, climate-driven 
coastal flooding is projected to see an additional $6.5 billion in urban property damages.71 WRI 
has argued that investing in adaptation and flood defense will not only protect millions of lives 




In 2019, the NIBS released a report on the value of hazard mitigation to reduce risk as 
America faces natural disasters that are increasing in strength and frequency. It highlighted the 
benefits of natural hazard mitigation, including the following findings on federal grants and their 
resultant benefits.72 
• The overall benefit-cost ratio (BCR) for federal grants is about 6:1. For every $1 spent on 
mitigation costs, $6 can be saved in future disaster costs. For example, if the cost of 
investment is about $27.4 billion, the estimated benefit is $157.9 billion (figure 4). 
• Mitigation could save the federal treasury about $930 million per year (figure 5). The 
study found that an annual average of $10 billion in federal funds is spent on disasters via 
                                                     
71 Samantha Kuzma and Tianyi Luo, “The Number of People Affected by Floods Will Double Between 2010 and 
2030,” World Resources Institute, April 23, 2020, https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/04/aqueduct-floods-investment-
green-gray-infrastructure.  
72 NIBS, Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: 2019 Report, December 2019, https://www.nibs.org/page/mitigationsaves. 
Per NIBS, one of the aims of Mitigation Saves is “to assist Congress and policymakers to develop effective federal 
programs that support pre-disaster mitigation and encourage more mitigation investments from the public and private 
sectors.” 
Figure 3. Damage to the United States of America's Urban 
Assets by Coastal Flooding. (Aqueduct Floods, World 
Resources Institute, 2020.) 
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individual and public assistance, as well as other costs. The natural hazard mitigation 
measures studied in the report are estimated to lower those expenditures by ~8% 
(approximately $800 million per 
year), and to increase tax revenues by 
approximately $130 million per year 
as a result of fewer tax deductions for 
disaster-related losses. Figure 5 
shows the breakdown of the benefits 
to the federal treasury stemming from 
mitigation activities.  
 
 
It is worth noting the BCR for federal spending on hazard mitigation has increased in the past 15 
years. A 2005 NIBS study had estimated a 4:1 ratio, but the increase to 6:1 makes a stronger case 
Figure 4. Total Costs and Benefits of 
23 Years of Federal Mitigation 
Grants. (NIBS, 2019.) 
Figure 5. Annual Savings to the Federal 
Treasury Resulting from Natural Hazard 
Mitigation. (NIBS, 2019.) 
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for proactive investment.73 In its latest report, the NIBS examined public sector mitigation 
programs of FEMA, HUD, and the Economic Development Administration (EDA) administered 
over 23 years for four types of natural hazards (coastal and riverine flooding, hurricanes, 
earthquakes, and fires) in its analysis. With regard to land use planning to reduce flood hazard, 
the report stated that although “the costs of property acquisition and demolition or relocation are 
high, future losses are completely avoided.”74 The added benefits of acquisition can include the 
creation of space for parks. Thousands of property acquisitions have been completed with 
FEMA’s involvement in the past decade. However, in comparison with the 5 million properties 
associated with National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) policies as of 2016, relocations and 
acquisitions account for a very small percentage of mitigation actions.75 These evaluations of 
acquisition and relocation as climate resilience measures offer insight into the positive economic 
impact the proposed grant program could have on coastal communities at high risk from coastal 
hazards. 
The majority of benefits (80%) from hazard mitigation were savings associated with 
casualties and post-traumatic stress disorder (43%) and property (37%), as illustrated in figure 4, 
suggesting that mitigation helps in the protection of people and public health, as well as 
residential and business property. While the coverage of hazards in the report was broader than 
coastal flooding and the focus was on natural hazard mitigation for components of infrastructure 
and buildings, the report shows that public sector support has a proven, and relatively long-term 
record of implementing grants that led to significant savings benefits. NIBS found that every state 
in the contiguous U.S. experienced at least $10 million in benefits from the considered federal 
grants, and that the majority of those states enjoyed $1 billion in benefits.76 As an addition to the 
                                                     
73 Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, “Investing in Resilience Today to Prepare for Tomorrow’s Climate Change,” Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, vol. 74, no. 2 (2018), p.66-67, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1436805. 
74 NIBS, Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: 2019 Report, p.183-184. 
75 NIBS, Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: 2019 Report, p.183-184. 
76 NIBS, Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: 2019 Report, p.19. 
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existing federal grants related to hazard mitigation, the proposed program could help deliver 
additional benefits to eligible states in the next decade by supporting projects that protect lives 
and prevent millions of dollars in economic damages and disaster costs. In the larger picture of 
federal spending, it could also help shift the government’s priorities away from post-disaster aid, 
and towards pre-disaster preparedness through investment in resilience. 
Despite these benefits to society and government, this policy option has a number of 
potential weaknesses that impede its ability to support communities threatened by coastal 
hazards. The Disaster Mitigation and Coastal Resilience Grant program is not guaranteed to meet 
the demands of climate migration activities in a few ways, making it less effective and efficient. 
The grant may fall short in providing states with enough resources to finance and complete 
relocations from beginning to end, which has hampered these projects over time. For a single 
relocation effort alone, costs can be expected to be well over $100 million for a small community. 
In the case of Newtok, which is home to about 400 people, Denali Commission officials 
estimated in 2019 that it would take ~$115 million in order to move from Mertarvik.77 That figure 
included the development of the new site at Mertarvik, building of sufficient infrastructure, and 
cleanup of the Newtok site. From FY2016 to FY2018, the Commission invested $34 million for 
Village Infrastructure Protection (VIP) related initiatives.78 However, as the Commission’s cost 
estimate suggests, the level of investment in the move to the new site leading up to 2019 had been 
insufficient. In addition to concerns around what adequate support would entail, some 
stakeholders expressed concern that the creation of a new funding source could unintentionally 
hinder climate change progress “mainstreaming of climate change considerations into existing 
federal programs or lead to the elimination of other sources of funding for climate resilience 
projects.”79 In this sense, the grant program could inadvertently deemphasize the value of other 
                                                     
77 GAO-20-488, p.13, 17. 
78 Denali Commission, “Village Infrastructure Protection,” https://www.denali.gov/programs/village-infrastructure-
protection/.  
79 GAO-20-127, p. 26 
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federal climate change programs, thereby weakening the reach of national climate resilience 
efforts. 
In addition, this program does not rectify a notable administrative gap that has been a key 
weakness in community relocation projects to date—the lack of federal leadership on climate 
migration.80 While NOAA does not have statutory authority to organize federal assistance for 
climate migration, this grant is designed to support climate migration projects within the bounds 
of the CZMA. It would be an extension of existing coastal management policy implemented by 
OCM and state CMPs. In other words, the grant program does not create a national mechanism 
for coordinating climate migration activities beyond the National Coastal Zone Management 
Program and other engaged agencies and stakeholders. In the continued absence of clear federal 
leadership, we could expect to see inefficiency through drawn-out planning and implementation 
of relocation projects. This could prolong and increase communities’ exposure to coastal hazards. 
as GAO observed to be the case in Newtok, Alaska and Isle de Jean Charles, Louisiana. It took 
Newtok 30 years to begin relocating, and Isle de Jean Charles dealt with a complicated 
resettlement timeline that took over 20 years.81 Until Congress authorizes a federal entity to 
coordinate climate migration priorities and activities, this grant could be perceived as an ad hoc 
NOAA program serving as a limited testing ground for federal support for community-led 
relocation and climate resilience through an existing coastal management program (i.e. state 
CMPs under the National Coastal Zone Management Program). 
Uncertainty also raises concerns regarding the spending efficiency of the program. 
Experts and stakeholders alike have emphasized the importance of accounting for uncertainty 
around the benefits resulting from federal investment in climate resilience projects. GAO not only 
identified efficiency criteria that could help guide these investments, but also pointed out the 
                                                     
80 GAO-20-488, p.38-41. 
81 GAO-20-488, p.38-39. 
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difficulty of estimating the monetary value of some benefits.82 If much of the benefits of climate 
resilience are realized far in the future, a potential unintended consequence of the grant could be 
that the most urgent, short-term projects will receive more attention from CMPs, even with a 
stringent grant proposal evaluation process overseen by NOAA. This would result in a similar 
trend as the observed tendency for federal funds to focus on post-disaster response needs. 
In addition, the grant’s eligibility requirement could weaken the Disaster Mitigation and 
Coastal Resilience Program’s ability to treat coastal communities equitably. Given that only 
coastal states with NOAA-approved CMPs may apply, the accessibility and distribution of funds 
rest partially on whether (1) states elect to obtain CMP approval from NOAA, and (2) the level of 
engagement of those CMPs. Without full participation from coastal states, vulnerable 
communities could be left without access to funding that is intended to be more inclusive of slow-
onset events or non-disaster scenarios. While there are proven incentives for eligible states to 
participate in CZMA, there is no guarantee that they will continue to do so in the years to come. 
Alaska is a notable example of this downside to the program’s eligibility provision. At present, it 
is the only eligible state that has chosen not to participate in the CZMA. The state’s CMP expired 
in July 2011, and without renewal, became ineligible for CZMA grants under sections 306, 306A, 
308, 309, or 310.83 Political and industry-related influences may well have contributed to the state 
legislature’s decision to withdraw from the NCZMP.84 Other CMPs may face discontinuation as a 
result of state-specific decisions, and they will be disqualified from relevant grants under the 
CZMA—including this proposed option—despite being prime candidates that have already 
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locally determined that partial or full community relocation is the most economical, safe, and 
culturally-sensitive option for their residents. 
 
Political Analysis 
The authorizations of appropriations for CMZA grant programs have expired, but Congress has 
continued to appropriate funds for them over the years. The Coastal Zone Enhancement Grant 
under Sec. 309 itself was last authorized for appropriations in FY1999.85 However, during the 
Trump administration, NOAA requested to eliminate grants under the CZM Program in its budget 
proposals for FY2018, FY2019, and FY2020.86 Congress rejected these requests, and ultimately 
increased the amount appropriated for coastal management grants in the past three years (table 
1).87 
Table 1. Appropriations for NOAA Coastal Management Grants, FY2018-FY2020 
Fiscal 
Year 
Appropriations for Coastal 
Management Grants 
2018 $75,098,000 (Actual) 
2019 $75,500,000 (Enacted) $75,317,000 (Actual) 
2020 $77,000,000 (Enacted) (+$1.5M) 
 
Despite the agency’s plans to eliminate funding, this incremental increase illustrates the 
disagreement between Congress and the White House about whether to prioritize coastal 
management issues, and environmental issues more broadly. This would suggest there is 
sufficient bipartisan agreement among lawmakers regarding the value of the CZM Program grants 
to keep them operational. That said, the Disaster Mitigation and Coastal Resilience Act, which 
also seeks to reauthorize appropriations for CZMA grants alongside the new grant, is not 
                                                     
85 CRS, Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA): Overview and Issues for Congress, R45460, January 2019, p.11, 13. 
86 CRS, R45460, p.14; NOAA, Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2020, p.52, 59. 
https://www.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/NOAA-FY20-Congressional-Justification.pdf. 
87 NOAA, Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2020, p.NOS-61, https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2019-
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guaranteed to pass in a Republican-controlled Senate. If it does manage to reach enactment, the 
program may not be implemented as intended, even with a history of congressional support and 
clear demand for funding. For instance, in FY2015, NOAA only had $4.5 million available for its 
Regional Coastal Resilience grant program (which is implemented under Sec. 310 of the CZMA), 
but the agency received 132 qualified applications requesting $105 million.88 The program was 
funded from FY2015 to FY2017 but was then combined with another resilience-focused grant 
within NOAA Fisheries in 2017. Thereafter, the agency was involved in a coastal resilience fund 
with the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NFWF) from 2018 to 2019, as opposed to a 
program separately overseen by NOAA.89 
Contrary to what is reflected in NOAA’s recent budget requests, there is an urgent need 
and demand for federal support in coastal management and resilience programs. A number of key 
actors would strongly agree with this. Officials from state CMPs coordinating with the agency 
have emphasized the critical value of federal assistance for coastal zone management. They have 
previously expressed concern that the amount available is not enough “to address states’ needs in 
implementing projects.”90 GAO interviewed officials from 25 state CMPs, all of whom shared 
this sentiment in the face of their respective programmatic needs.91 As the primary, state 
government-level implementors of the NCZMP, they are highly likely to welcome funding 
opportunities through the Disaster Mitigation and Coastal Resilience Grant program. Existing 
federal programs have a limited ability to support climate migration-related activities. This 
program expands NOAA’s capacity to assist states in this category of resilience efforts, and will 
enable CMPs to utilize federal funds in ways that were not previously allowable under certain 
                                                     
88 GAO, Climate Change: Information on NOAA’s Support for States’ Marine Coastal Ecosystem Resilience Efforts, 
GAO-16-834, September 28, 2016, p.13, https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/680099.pdf; NOAA Coastal Resilience 
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grant requirements (e.g. projects involving low-cost construction or acquisition, which are both 
unallowable costs for Sec. 30992). 
Beyond GAO evaluations of the federal government’s record on climate resilience, expert 
communities and advocacy groups will also be paying close attention to U.S. policies and 
programs. Climate scientists and policy analysts in the non-governmental organization (NGO) 
space will scrutinize the merits of the proposed grant program. There is strong consensus among 
nonpartisan NGO constituencies that the current level of investment in resilience and adaptation 
measures is insufficient. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)—a national nonprofit 
dedicated “to use rigorous, independent science to solve our planet’s most pressing problems”—
is one such proponent of ambitious and strategic investment in climate change adaptation.93 This 
group of scientists, analysts, and policy experts would view a well-designed grant program as an 
example of policymakers taking climate change risks and preparedness seriously. In its 
recommendations for science-based adaptation, UCS underscores the threat that political power 
poses to equitable adaptation investment decisions. They warn that “public officials tend to focus 
on the monetary value of [damage inflicted by events such as powerful storms],” which “can lead 
to damage-mitigating public investments being preferentially allocated to higher-value 
locations.”94 
The World Resources Institute would agree with the science-based and equitable 
approach to climate adaptation that UCS advocates. A recent piece on flood data analysis by WRI 
found that infrastructure investments can significantly lower flood risk to millions of people and 
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trillions in dollars of property around the world.95 In addition, the institute’s Climate Resilience 
Practice published a commentary in 2018 arguing that, in order to equitably and effectively create 
adaptation solutions and identify priority actions, “it is important to engage affected peoples and 
communities, resolve potential competing interests between stakeholders, and consider the pros 
and cons of proposed actions over different time horizons.”96 WRI would praise the proactive 
investment and locally-driven approach laid out in the Disaster Mitigation and Coastal Resilience 
Grant program. Positive acknowledgement from organizations such as UCS, WRI, and their like-
minded peers would signify that the policy option is both substantive and sound, as these entities 
are internationally recognized groups working independently of the U.S. government. By 
extension, their approval would reaffirm that the program is evidence of American leadership on 
climate policy. Conversely, their harsh critique would indicate that the program is weak, if not 
reinforcing the lack of a strategic, national approach to investment in climate resilience and 
adaptation.97 
Climate change and relevant policies have become increasingly important to the 
American public as well. In a time when people are witnessing unprecedented natural disasters at 
home and abroad, voters are prioritizing climate issues in unprecedented numbers as well, 
according to the Environmental Voter Project.98 Public polling reveals a significant amount of 
agreement among Americans regarding their views on climate and energy, as well as the 
government’s role in addressing climate change. Irrespective of the Trump administration’s 
position on climate science and efforts to roll back Obama-era environmental policies, the public 
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has become more supportive of climate action in recent years. In 2018, a study conducted by 
Stanford University with ABC News and Resources for the Future (RFF) showed that there is 
strong public support for climate policy, and “public belief in the existence and threat of global 
warming has been strikingly consistent over the last 20 years.”99 It is worth noting that the gap in 
perspective between Republicans and Democrats on the issue is not especially wide: 
• Republicans: 57% believed the world’s temperature has probably been increasing 
over the past 100 years. 66% believed that the increase was mostly or partly caused 
by humans. 
• Democrats: 69% believed global warming has probably been happening. Further 
analysis showed that this was an underestimate—in reality, closer to 89% believed it. 
 
This creates a generally positive outlook in terms of public support for a program that would 
increase federal climate action through an existing national program like the CZMA. Notably, 
there is also a strong sense that the government is not doing enough on the issue. About 68% of 
all respondents said that the U.S. government should do more to deal with global warming. This 
figure is relatively high, and from 1997 to 2018, it has fluctuated between 56%-70%.100 These 
sentiments remain consistent. In a more recent survey that Pew Research Center published in 
2019, about 67% of adults said the federal government is doing too little to reduce the effects of 
climate change. This statistic did not change from the same study conducted in 2018.101 
There is reason to believe that the public will support the proposed grant program 
because Americans recognize the interaction of social, economic, and environmental issues when 
they consider public policy. With regard to adaptation policy specifically, another study 
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conducted by Stanford showed that 83% of Americans favor preparation to deal with possible 
consequences of global warming. In addition, more respondents said they believe that 
implementing coastal adaptation policies will help the economy (42%) and create more jobs 
(60%), as shown in figure 6.102 Furthermore, Americans appear to still care about these issues 
during a time of crisis. This year, the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, George 
Mason University Center for Climate Change Communication, and Climate Nexus jointly 
conducted a poll that also pointed to strong interest in more government action on climate. 
Participants were asked whether they support or oppose a number of policies as part of the 
recovery from the coronavirus pandemic. The majority of respondents (71%) said they support 
increasing federal funding to protect vulnerable low-income communities and communities of 
color from environmental dangers like severe flooding and hurricanes (figure 7).103 This suggests 
that the public also considers equity and social justice with respect to climate policy even when it 
is attached to a larger policy ‘package’ responding to a global health crisis. These polling insights 
imply that the views of the public are well-matched with the socioeconomic and cultural 
considerations that the Disaster Mitigation and Coastal Resilience Grant would take into account.  
                                                     
102 American Public Opinion on Global Warming, Stanford University Political Psychology Research Group, March 
2013, https://pprggw.wordpress.com/prepare-global-warming/.  
103 Oliver Milman, “Guardian/Vice poll finds most US 2020 voters strongly favor climate action,” The Guardian, 
September 23, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/sep/23/us-voters-climate-change-guardian-vice-poll; 
“Guardian/VICE Media Poll: Most U.S. voters support climate action and want climate questions during the 
presidential debates,” Climate Nexus, September 23, 2020, https://climatenexus.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Covering-Climate-Now-Climate-Change-Poll-Press-Release.pdf; “National Poll Toplines,” 
Climate Nexus, September 2020, https://climatenexus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Covering-Climate-Now-
Climate-Change-National-Poll.pdf.  
Figure 6. Percent of Americans Who Think Implementing Coastal 
Adaptation Policies Will Hurt or Help the Economy and the Job Market. 
(Stanford University Political Psychology Research Group, March 2013.) 
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Figure 7. Support for Increasing Federal Funding for Protecting 
Vulnerable Low-Income Communities and Communities of Color from 
Immediate Environmental Dangers as Part of the Recovery from the 
Coronavirus Pandemic. (The Guardian/VICE, September 2020.) 
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In Rhode Island, coastal hazard management has been an important environmental policy 
for at least 42 years. You would be well-positioned to champion this new grant program, as the 
state has participated in the NCZMP since 1978.104 The CMP is led by the Rhode Island Coastal 
Resources Management Council (CRMC) and supports the state in dealing with hazards including 
flooding from SLR and storms, coastal erosion, catastrophic flooding, and damage from 
hurricanes and other extreme weather events. One of the central objectives of the CMP is to help 
exposed communities “become more resilient to coastal hazards through proactive planning, 
science-based regulations and permitting decisions, strong partnerships, innovative tools, and 
helpful technical assistance.” 105 
Relocation is not a new concept to Rhode Islanders who are facing critical coastal risks. 
In the 2020 evaluation report from the state CMP, it is stated that “homeowners need to identify 
risks under different storm surge and sea level rise scenarios and consider options for more 
resilient construction or relocation to reduce risk.”106 Constituents who anticipate this level of risk 
exposure or are already facing the decision to move will approve of your support for a new 
CZMA grant that would increase federal assistance for a resilience strategy that did not 
previously receive much consideration. The Disaster Mitigation and Coastal Resilience Grant 
program would align well with both the state’s environmental hazard management needs, as well 
as your record on climate issues. 
 
Recommendation 
The Disaster Mitigation and Coastal Resilience Grant program would be a valuable addition to 
NOAA’s grant portfolio under the CZMA, and I recommend you proceed with the proposal. 
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Dedicating funds to strengthen federal support for climate migration activities through coastal 
management programs is a prudent course of action. Without increased investment in climate 
change preparedness, America’s citizens, economy, and government will continue to bear the 
escalating costs of climate change impacts throughout regions exposed to coastal hazards. 
It is crucial to acknowledge, however, that the program would not fulfill the outstanding 
need for Congress to designate a federal agency to lead coordination of climate migration 
activities. This may be perceived as the proposal’s biggest weakness with respect to facilitating 
relocation operations, including those that may need assistance in the future but are located 
beyond regions that are eligible to participate in the NCZMP. Clarifying federal leadership for 
this area of government assistance is important and recommended for the future success of 
climate migration.107 The proposed program may instead help advance that clarification process 
through lessons learned from NOAA’s increased assistance for new allowable relocation projects 
(e.g. infrastructure projects and acquisition) within the bounds of the CZMA. 
The Disaster Mitigation and Coastal Resilience Act would create the first federal program 
explicitly designed to support climate migration as a resilience strategy. The allocation of $100 
million annually for the grant will boost NOAA’s ability to pursue its coastal zone enhancement 
objectives, including the prevention or reduction of threats to life and destruction of property.108 
This is an opportune moment for Congress to not only protect vulnerable communities exposed to 
critical coastal risks, but also shift government focus towards proactive resilience policies and 
spending at the national level. A key message from the Fourth National Climate Assessment 
released in 2018 was that “climate change outpaces adaptation planning,” accompanied by a 
warning that failing to adjust to projected climate risk could come with a high cost.109 It is 
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necessary to adapt to those risks proactively, as opposed to depending on interpretations of 
historical impacts to make decisions. GAO’s findings support the notion that U.S. investment in 
resilience measures is incommensurate with the estimated scale of climate risks.110 As one of the 
requesters of the July 2020 GAO report that assessed the federal government’s limited support for 
climate migration, you could utilize the Disaster Mitigation and Coastal Resilience Act as a 
follow-up action.111  
Per the latest GAO High-Risk List, “the federal government has not made measurable 
progress to reduce its fiscal exposure to climate change,” and it remains an area that requires 
“significant attention.”112  The proposed grant program can contribute to the prioritization of pre-
disaster resilience, a deviation from the historical tendency to focus on post-disaster response. In 
doing so, the program has strong potential to enhance human security and prosperity, as well as 
save hundreds of millions of dollars in federal spending. As experts have highlighted, the return 
on investment for resilience measures is worthwhile because the subsequent benefits significantly 
outweigh the costs. Based on analyses of federal mitigation grants, NIBS reports show that the 
benefit-cost ratio associated with hazard mitigation has increased from 4:1 to 6:1 over the past 15 
years—and the total benefits from $27.4 billion in grants awarded over 23 years led to $157.9 
billion in benefits.113 Increasing spending on hazard mitigation is essential to keep pace with 
climate change impacts and reduce future damages and costs. Furthermore, the majority of 
Americans support government action on climate change, and they simultaneously care about the 
socioeconomic and cultural nuances of interrelated policies.114 
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Ilan Kelman, Professor of Disasters and Health at the University College of London, asks 
in his book, Disaster by Choice, “Why do we not continually use the knowledge we have to avert 
disasters?”115 With what expert communities and policymakers have learned about known and 
anticipated climate change impacts the nation will face, pre-disaster investment in coastal 
resilience is imperative. If the government conducts ‘business as usual’ in terms of climate risk 
management, the federal fiscal exposure from climate risks is certain to increase. Vulnerable 
groups will not have enough resources to handle these risks on their own, and the federal 
government will be called upon to assist in locations where community and state-level efforts are 
inadequate to manage the urgency and danger of coastal hazards. 
Taking these factors into account, you have meaningful and science-based justifications 
to put forward this policy option. At its core, the Disaster Mitigation and Coastal Resilience Act 
presents a chance to invest in a community-driven movement towards a more climate-resilient, 
productive, and secure future for Americans. If the legislation ultimately does not pass, your 
support for the proposed grant program would nevertheless signal to constituents, environmental 
experts, your peers, and other stakeholders that you are serious about prioritizing environmental 
hazards and climate change preparedness. The proposal itself will showcase the extent of your 
concern regarding the existential threat that vulnerable coastal communities face as their 
environments are rendered uninhabitable by SLR, flooding, and erosion exacerbated by climate 
change. It will make evident your commitment to national readiness for the variability of nature 
and risk management—a task that requires continuous and collective vigilance. 
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